Optimal Coexistence of Long-term and Short-term contracts in Labor Markets by Inés Macho-Stadler et al.
 
 
    Working papers series 
   Department of Economics 
 
 
   
 
 
WP ECON 11.08 
 
 
Optimal Coexistence of Long-term and Short-
term contracts in Labor Markets 
 
 
Inés Macho-Stadler (U. Autònoma de Barcelona) 
David Pérez-Castrillo (U. Autònoma de Barcelona) 






JEL Classification numbers: D86, C78 
Keywords: Labor contracts, short-term, long-term, matching, 
incentives. Optimal Coexistence of Long-term and
Short-term contracts in Labor Markets∗
Inés Macho-Stadler† David Pérez-Castrillo‡ Nicolás Porteiro§
June 13, 2011
Abstract
We consider a market where ﬁrms hire workers to run their projects and such
projects diﬀer in proﬁtability. At any period, each ﬁrm needs two workers to suc-
cessfully run its project: a junior agent, with no speciﬁc skills, and a senior worker,
whose eﬀort is not veriﬁable. Senior workers diﬀer in ability and their competence
is revealed after they have worked as juniors in the market. We study the length of
the contractual relationships between ﬁr m sa n dw o r k e r si na ne n v i r o n m e n tw h e r e
the matching between ﬁrms and workers is the result of market interaction. We
show that, despite in a one-ﬁrm-one-worker set-up long-term contracts are the op-
timal choice for ﬁrms, market forces often induce ﬁrms to use short-term contracts.
Unless the market only consists of ﬁrms with very proﬁtable projects, ﬁrms oper-
ating highly proﬁtable projects oﬀer short-term contracts to ensure the service of
high-ability workers and those with less lucrative projects also use short-term con-
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 tracts to save on the junior workers’ wage. Intermediate ﬁrms may (or may not)
hire workers through long-term contracts.









Partners may establish relationships that last for several periods. In job contracts, for
instance, some ﬁrms hire the same worker for several years with a long-term contract,
while others may prefer to sign contracts period by period, sometimes with the same
worker, sometimes with diﬀerent workers over time. One question that arises is when is
it better for the employer to write a long-term contract that covers the whole length of
the relationship and when is a short-term contract signed for a certain period of time
superior, knowing that once that period is over the ﬁrm has to oﬀer another short-term
contract.
The contributions by Lambert (1983), Rogerson (1985), Malcomson and Spinnewyn
(1988), and Chiappori et al. (1994), among others, address the previous question in
settings characterized by moral hazard where one ﬁrm (the principal) enters into a long-
lasting relationship with a worker (the agent). In these settings, if the ﬁrm and the agent
can commit to a long-term contract, the ﬁrm can design a long-term agreement that
dominates the sequence of optimal short-term contracts. In fact, long-term contracts can
always replicate the sequence of the optimal short-term contracts while the reverse is, in
general, not possible. This result is robust to a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations and
implies that, if commitment on the part of the participants is possible, we should expect
ﬁrms to use mainly long-term contracts in practice.1 However, this is not the case and
t h ef a c tt h a td i ﬀerent ﬁrms in similar markets follow diﬀerent time-duration contracts
suggests that there may be other explanations beyond lack of commitment.
A possible explanation can be obtained if instead of analysing isolated labor market
interactions, we study markets where heterogeneous ﬁrms compete for workers. As the
recent contributions by Dam and Pérez-Castrillo (2006), Serfes (2008), Terviö (2008) and
Alonso-Paulí and Pérez-Castrillo (forthcoming) have shown, when the analysis is enlarged
to take into consideration market interaction, then the form of the optimal contracts may
substantially diﬀer from the agreements that one obtains for a given relationship studied
in isolation. When heterogenous principals compete for heterogenous agents, the identity
1When commitment on the agent side is diﬃcult, contracts may include, for example, non-compete
clauses under which the agent agrees not to pursue a similar profession or trade in a ﬁrm in the same
industry if he breaks the contract. Contracts may also include other clauses that will reduce mobility by








 of the partners in each relationship (in addition to the contract signed) is endogenous, as
it is the level of utility obtained by the agents.
In line with this strand of the literature, in this paper we introduce and analyze an
equilibrium model to discuss advantages and disadvantages of short-term versus long-
term contracts in a dynamic environment where workers are subject to a moral hazard
problem. On the one hand, and consistent with the principal-agent literature, long-
term contracts allow the better provision of incentives because ﬁrms can credibly transfer
payments from early to late periods in the life of the workers, and this transfer alleviates
the incentive compatibility constraint. On the other hand, as will become clear later,
short-term contracts allow the market to ensure a better matching between agents’ ability
and ﬁrms’ needs. Those agents that turn out to have high ability can be hired by ﬁrms
that can really proﬁtf r o mt h e m .
In our model heterogenous ﬁrms hire workers to run their projects. Firms diﬀer in
the proﬁtability of their project. At any period, each ﬁr mn e e d st w ot y p e so fw o r k e r s :a
junior agent, with no speciﬁc skills, and a senior experienced, worker whose expertise is
crucial for the good development of the project. Every worker starts as a junior agent
during his ﬁrst period in the labor market. At this point in their lives, all workers are
indistinguishable in terms of ability. After the period as an apprentice, the worker becomes
senior for the second, and ﬁnal, period of his job career. In our model, the ﬁrst period
has a training component: workers acquire the knowledge and experience needed to run
a project when seniors. We assume that this period gives human capital speciﬁct ot h e
industry. This allows any worker that was hired (and trained) by a ﬁrm as a junior to
r u nap r o j e c ta sas e n i o ri na n yﬁrm of the market.2
The model is dynamic not only because the relationships (may) involve several peri-
ods, but also because information about workers’ characteristics changes over time: after
the agent has worked for a ﬁrm as a junior, the ﬁrms and the worker himself learn his
competence as senior, which was ex-ante unknown for all market participants. Therefore,
while all junior workers are indistinguishable, this is not the case for senior workers as not
only their responsibilities (the project they work on), but also their abilities may be quite
2In other words, we do not deal with ﬁrm-speciﬁc training in the model. If there is some ﬁrm-speciﬁc
ability, workers who change jobs in the second period of their lives lose their ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital









 diﬀerent. Consequently, we model a very simple technology of training that combines two
dimensions of learning. First, there is learning because the innate ability of the worker is
revealed through his training as a junior and this information becomes common knowl-
edge for the industry. Second, there is a learning-by-doing component since working as
junior is a prerequisite to later running a project as a senior. In this respect, the paper
is related to the literature on on-the-job talent discovery. In this literature, the paper by
Terviö (2009) shares some modeling choices with ours as it also presents a situation where
workers’ innate ability is unknown for the market (and the workers themselves) until they
actually work for a ﬁrm. However, in Terviö’s paper the objective is diﬀerent as he is
concerned by the possibility that market imperfections hamper the process of discovering
talent.
In the model, a moral hazard problem is present as senior workers’ eﬀort is not con-
tractible. On the contrary, and just for simplicity, we consider juniors’ eﬀo r tt ob ec o n -
tractible. All the participants are risk neutral and they all have the capacity to commit
to a long-term contract.3 However, workers are protected by limited liability: their salary
when junior and their salary when senior cannot be lower than certain thresholds.
We characterize equilibria in this market, which accounts for the type of contract
oﬀered by each ﬁrm and the characteristics of these contracts. Our equilibrium concept is
close to the idea of “stability” used in the matching literature that has analyzed contracts
in environments where the matching between ﬁrms and workers is endogenous.4 To be
an equilibrium, an outcome (that is, a matching and a set of contracts) must be immune
to deviations. In our environment, at equilibrium, it must be the case that a ﬁrm cannot
obtain higher proﬁts by changing its strategy, that is, by oﬀering contracts to workers
that make both the ﬁrm and the workers be better-oﬀ than before.
We ﬁrst show that ﬁrms signing equilibrium long-term contracts oﬀer low salaries to
3If no participant can commit to a long-term contract, then all must be short-term contracts. If the
participants in one of the sides of the market, say the ﬁrms, can commit while the others cannot, then
there can still be room for long-term contracts, but they are typically less eﬃcient than in the environment
with full commitment. In terms of the commitment possibilities, we place ourselves in the best scenario
for the prevalence of long-term contracts.
4Stability and competitive equilibrium are very close concepts. Any stable outcome is also a compet-
itive equilibrium and vice-versa. For (early) matching models where the parties decide on money instead
of contracts see, for instance, the original contribution by Shapley and Shubik (1972), and the excellent








 junior workers together with the promise of high reward when senior. This allows the ﬁrms
to alleviate the incentive problem they face with senior agents, improving the eﬃciency of
the relationship and also their proﬁts. Since they commit to do so, these ﬁrms will keep
the agents when senior, irrespective of their ability. Firms that sign short-term contracts
hire junior agents with no promise of continuation. They also sign short-term contracts
with senior workers (who may or may not be the same they hired the previous period as
juniors); the terms of the agreement may depend on the workers’ ability level.
We have already argued that the optimal long-term contract always (at least weakly)
dominates any sequence of short-term contracts when the identity of the parties matched
in a job contract is predetermined. However, short-term contracts can be beneﬁcial for
ﬁrms when the ﬁrm-worker matching is endogenous. Short-term contracts allow the
ﬁrms to screen workers before putting them in charge of leading a project. This non-
commitment strategy gives ﬁrms the freedom to focus on the particular type of senior
worker that ﬁts their needs. Therefore, ﬁr m sf a c eat r a d e - o ﬀ between choosing the op-
timal contract for a given match (long-term are superior to short-term agreements) and
selecting a contract that allows a better selection (hiring high-ability senior workers is
more important for some ﬁrms than for others).
The market equilibrium depends on the characteristics of the set of ﬁrms. When
only ﬁrms with very proﬁtable projects exist in the market, all of them sign long-term
contracts at equilibrium. Each ﬁrm oﬀers the same agreement that it would oﬀer if no
market would have existed. More interestingly, we show that, except in this case where
t h em a r k e to n l yc o n s i s t so fﬁrms with very proﬁtable projects, there is always a set of ﬁrms
that sign short-term contracts with their junior workers and specialize in a particular type
of seniors. Depending on the value they attach to their projects, some ﬁr m sa l w a y sl o o k
for high-ability while others hire low-ability senior workers. Firms with highly proﬁtable
projects give a great deal of relevance to hiring high-ability senior agents to run their
projects and, hence, they are willing to oﬀer high wages to attract them. As a result,
the expected utility of junior workers when they accept short-term contracts becomes
higher because, if they turn out to be of high ability, they will obtain a high reward when
senior. The expectation of this potential reward leads workers to accept, when junior,
a low wage. Firms with relatively poor projects take advantage of this reduction in the








 than to the fact that they end up contracting with a low-ability senior worker. Therefore,
at equilibrium, the ﬁrms with the most proﬁtable projects use short-term contracts to
ensure the services of high-ability workers while the ﬁrms with the least proﬁtable projects
use short-term contracts to save in the cost of hiring junior workers. In this sense, the
matching between ﬁrms and senior agents is positive assortative, for the sets that choose
short-term contracts.5
The trade-oﬀ between the advantages of long-term and short-term contracts is often
solved in favor of the use of long-term contracts for ﬁrms with intermediate projects. The
likelihood of the coexistence of the two types of contracts is higher as the distribution
of ﬁrms is more biased toward good projects, the discount rate is lower, the diﬀerence
between the reservation utility of junior workers and the minimum salary is lower, the
diﬀerence in performance between high and low-ability senior workers is higher, and the
cost of the workers’ eﬀort is lower.
Workers receive part of the increased surplus created by the optimal sorting of senior
workers promoted by the short-term agreements. Indeed, although all junior workers are
indistinguishable and they perform identical tasks, those who sign short-term contracts
expect a higher utility than those signing long-term contracts. Long-term agreements
allow the ﬁrms to avoid the competition for the best workers, who obtain high salaries
under short-term equilibrium contracts.
The characteristics of the set of workers in the market play an important role in
shaping the equilibrium contractual arrangements. We focus on markets where there is
a large proportion of low-productivity (normal) senior workers and a small proportion of
high-productivity senior workers (stars), where these highly-talented workers really make
ad i ﬀerence in the ﬁrms they work for and whose level of ability is public for all the
ﬁrms inside the industry. Moreover, the human capital acquired by seniors is industry-
speciﬁc and not just ﬁrm-speciﬁc. This model can provide a schematic version of the
university job market. The performance of researchers during the ﬁrst years after the
completion of their Ph.D., that we can associate to their “ability”, is public information
since it can be measured, for instance, by their publication record. In this job-market
some universities oﬀer Ph.D. graduates a tenure track position that guarantees tenure if,
5See Legros and Newman (2007) for conditions under which monotone matchings emerge in environ-








 after the probationary period, the candidate satisﬁes some predetermined performance
criteria (in terms of publications and other measures). The tenure-track system involves
a sequence of contracts (what in our model corresponds to short-term contracts). Other
universities sign tenure contracts from the very beginning and take the commitment of
keeping the researcher independent of the outcome of further evaluation (even if contract
conditions may indeed depend on performance). This corresponds to a long-term contract.
Arts and sports are also examples of markets where the ability of seniors is well-known,
as it is subject to public scrutiny through their performance and where this human capital
is mainly industry-speciﬁc. Singers or soccer players, for instance, may sign exclusive
contracts (with a studio, a record company, or a club) for a long period in which they are
prevented from recording an album for another company or playing with another club.
Other companies, however, choose to oﬀer shorter contracts, particularly to young singers
or players. The stars of these markets, a few individuals, attain prominence and success
and their value and earnings are signiﬁcantly greater than the earnings of the standard
worker in the markets. The same can be said about surgeons or creatives in advertising.
Finally, the market for upper executives also shares some similar features: these high
executives are well-known within their industry and their contracts may (or may not)
include special clauses aimed at preventing them from moving to another ﬁrm.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst paper to study how the choice of the
contractual length may be determined by market interaction. There are other papers that
have studied the implications of diﬀerent contractual arrangements but in widely diﬀerent
set-ups. Rice and Sen (2008) show how a reduction in the length of a contract can help
to alleviate the moral hazard problem when explicit incentives cannot be included in the
terms of the contract. In their paper, the optimal choice for the principal depends on
the balance between more incentives for eﬀort (short-term contracts) and lower wages
(long-term contracts).
The contribution by Ghosh and Waldman (2010) compares two contractual arrange-
ments: up-or-stay vs. up-or-out contracts in a setting with multiple ﬁrms competing for
a worker. The paper does not address the issue of endogenous matching since it studies
the ﬁrms’ Bertrand competition in wages to attract the single worker available in the
market. They show that up-or-out prevails when ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital is low and








 optimal. Similar to our paper, Ghatak et al. (2001) study an overlapping generations ver-
sion of a principal-agent problem where contracts are determined in general equilibrium.
In their model, all young workers are identical but have diﬀerent investment possibilities
when senior, depending on their performance. They do not allow for long term contracts
because their the authors’ concern is to explain the seniors’ decision between becoming
entrepreneurs or remaining workers.
In our paper, short-term contracts act as a form of probationary period that allows
ﬁrms and workers to achieve a better matching. It is, therefore, not a way in which ﬁrms
try to test if the worker is good enough for the job, but rather it allows senior workers to
b em a t c h e dw i t ht h o s eﬁr m sw h e r et h e ya r em o r ep r o d u c t i v e .I nt h i ss e n s e ,t h es h o r t - t e r m
contract serves as a sorting device. A related argument can be found in Loh (1994) where
it is discussed how introducing an employment probation can serve as a sorting device as
it will induce self-selection by workers. Firms oﬀering probationary employment will tend
to attract workers who are more conﬁdent about their capabilities.
Finally, the coexistence of ﬁxed payment schemes and incentive-based payment schemes
related to the characteristic of the workers is also present in a static adverse selection
framework where ﬁrms compete for agents. Matutes et al. (1994) study the choice of
compensation schemes by two ﬁrms that compete in a labor market where agents are
heterogenous and they have private information about their type. They show that, in
equilibrium, if ﬁrms are not too diﬀerent in the eyes of workers, one ﬁrm oﬀers a wage
rate and the other oﬀers a piece rate. By proposing diﬀerent compensation schemes, ﬁrms
induce self-selection among workers, which thereby decreases the intensity of competition
in the labor market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Sections 3, 4 and 5 analyze the candidate long-term and short-term contracts for equi-
librium. Section 6 characterizes the identity of the ﬁrms and workers that enter into the
relationship, the equilibrium salaries, as well as the contracts that emerge as a result of








 2M o d e l
We model the economy as an overlapping generation model where at each period ,w i t h
 =1 2, ﬁrms contract with workers to develop projects. Firms are inﬁnite-lived players
and the set of ﬁrms is constant for all periods. On the other hand, workers (agents) live
for two periods. Both, ﬁrms and workers discount the future according to the discount
factor ,w h e r e ∈ (01).
A l lp a r t i c i p a n t sa r ea s s u m e dt ob er i s kn e u t r a l .W ea l s oa s s u m et h a taw o r k e r ,a ta n y
age, enjoys limited liability over income. This constraint implies that his wage in any
period and contingency cannot be lower than a certain threshold .
At any period ,e a c hﬁrm is endowed with a project. The revenue for the ﬁrm from
the project is  + if it is developed successfully, whereas it is 0 in case of failure. 
can be interpreted as a ﬁxed component of the revenue that is not subject to uncertainty.
The additional value of the project in case of success, , is public information, it is the





,w i t h  0, according to the distribution function (). Hence, the set









and the distribution function () a r eg i v e n ;w ew i l ld i s c u s sa tt h ee n do f
the paper on these assumptions
Each period, a generation of workers is born. We assume that the measure of the set
of workers born at any period is larger than the measure of the set of ﬁrms. Therefore,
at period  t h em a r k e ti sc o m p o s e db yt h es e to fﬁrms, the set of workers that enter the
m a r k e tt h i sp e r i o da n dt h es e to fo l dw o r k e r st h a te n t e r e dt h em a r k e ta tp e r i o d−1.A t
period 1 t h e r ei sas e to fw o r k e r sw h oa r ea l r e a d yo l d .
To run its project, a ﬁrm needs to hire a non-specialized worker and a specialized
worker. Any agent is a non-specialized worker the ﬁrst period he works in this market.
6We assume that each ﬁrm’s revenue is composed of a part () that depends on the success of the
venture and a ﬁxed part () that is independent of its success. In our model, all ﬁrms have the same 
while they are heterogeneous with respect to  so that a “good” ﬁrm is a ﬁrm with a high . However,
workers have no inﬂuence on  and decisions do not depend on . Therefore, the analysis that we develop
is independent of whether  is the same for all the ﬁrms or whether it varies from ﬁrm to ﬁrm. We can
assume an arbitrary function () that associates a ﬁxed revenue  to each variable revenue  and all
the results go through for this, more general, scenario. It could be the case, for example, that () is








 After this ﬁrst job, a young agent that has worked for a ﬁrm becomes a specialized
worker; that is, working for a ﬁrm gives the agent the necessary skills to be in charge of a
project. We will also refer to non-specialized and specialized workers as junior and senior
agents, respectively.7 According to our assumptions, there are more junior workers than
non-specialized positions to ﬁll in the market.
A senior agent only enters a relationship if his expected utility is at least equal to
some “outside utility” that we denote by .T h a t i s ,  is the level of utility that a
senior agent can secure outside our economy, at any period. It can be understood as his
utility outside the labor market. Similarly, a junior agent only accepts a contract if his
expected intertemporal utility is at least  + .
All workers are indistinguishable when junior. However, when senior, agents may have
diﬀerent abilities in this market. An agent’s ability to run a project as a senior is ex-ante
unknown to all players, including the agent himself. The ability becomes publicly known
to all players once the agent has worked for any ﬁrm, that is, when he is senior.
A junior agent working for a ﬁrm does a routine job and exerts a predetermined and
contractible level of eﬀort.8 We normalize the cost for the agent of exerting this eﬀort to
zero. If we denote by  the payment to the junior agent, then his utility at this age is
equal to .
A senior agent working for a ﬁrm runs the project and his eﬀort (decision) is crucial
to its good development. This specialized eﬀort is not contractible (not veriﬁable) and
it inﬂuences the probability of success of the project. We assume that the probability
of success takes the form ,w h e r e is the senior agent’s eﬀort and the parameter 
summarizes his ability.9 The ability  can take two values:  or  with   ;
that is, for the same eﬀort 0, a high-ability senior agent has a higher probability of
7Those agents who did not work for any ﬁrm when young could also be hired as non-specialized workers
when old. In other words, the time when working as a junior is both a probational and a forming period.
However, we will assume that they are no longer in the market. As it will become clear once we develop
our analysis, this is just a simpliﬁcation since no ﬁrm would prefer to hire an old-non-specialized instead
of a junior worker.
8The assumption that the junior agent’s eﬀort is contractible provides a simple set-up. The main
conclusions of our analysis carry over a more complex model where the junior agent’s eﬀort is subject to
moral hazard as long as the eﬀort does not aﬀect the learning of the worker’s ability (this possiblity is
considered for example in Holmstrom, 1999).








 success () than a low-ability senior agent (). As said above, it is only after being
employed as a junior worker that an agent’s ability is public knowledge. Ex-ante, there
is a proportion  of high-ability agents in the population.
The result of the project (success or failure) is veriﬁable and the agents’ payment
c a nd e p e n do ni t .G i v e nt h a tt h ej u n i o ra g e n t ’ se ﬀort is veriﬁable, there is no reason to
oﬀer him a contingent payment and a ﬁxed salary  is optimal. On the other hand, a
contingent payment scheme should be oﬀered to the senior agent to give him the right
incentives. We denote by  =( ∆) such an incentive scheme, where the ﬁrst com-
ponent of the contract,  is the base payment, i.e., the transfer in case of failure while
the second part, ∆ is the bonus in case revenue  is obtained. The contract oﬀered
may be diﬀerent depending on the (publicly known) ability of the senior worker, that is,
we may have  diﬀerent from  Given the contract (∆), the expected utility of
a senior agent of ability  is
 + ∆ − ()
2
where ()
2 r e p r e s e n t st h ec o s to fs u p p l y i n ge ﬀort . Under contract (∆), the senior
agent will select the eﬀort that maximizes his expected utility, i.e.,
 =a r gm a x
 
{ + b ∆ − (b )
2}.




The previous equation represents the Incentive Compatibility Constraint ()o fas e n i o r
agent. The agent tends to exert a higher level of eﬀort the lower his cost of supplying
eﬀort (), the larger the bonus (∆) and the higher his skills ().
At any period , the expected proﬁts of an active ﬁrm that runs its project with a
junior agent, to whom it pays the salary , and with a senior agent of ability  through
a payment scheme (∆) are
 −  + ( − ∆) − 
Firms and workers in this market can sign either Short-term (ST) or Long-term (LT)
contracts. A ST contract between a ﬁrm and a junior agent consists of a salary .A n
ST contract with a senior agent is an incentive scheme (∆), that may be diﬀerent








 case of success). This senior agent was working for some ﬁrm in period  − 1, but not
necessarily for the same ﬁrm with which he is signing the ST contract at period .A nL T
contract between a ﬁrm and a junior agent at period  speciﬁes the salary that the worker
will receive during the ﬁrst period of the relationship and the incentive scheme that will
govern their relationship in period  +1 . The incentive scheme can be a function of the
revealed ability of the agent. That is, an LT contract is a vector ( ∆ ∆) and
it implies a commitment by the ﬁrm to keep the worker when senior, and a commitment
by the agent to work for the same ﬁrm at period  +1independent of his ability.
Each ﬁrm decides on the contracts it oﬀers at each period and also on the type of
workers it hires. Therefore, an Outcome in the economy speciﬁes, for each period ,t h e
assignment of (some) junior and senior workers to ﬁrms and the contracts that govern
their relationship. Remember that a contract between a ﬁrm and a junior agent at period
 is signed at this period; it can be either an ST or an LT contract. On the other hand,
the contract governing the relationship between a senior worker and a ﬁrm at period 
can be either an ST contract signed at this period or an LT contract that was signed at
period  − 1.
We look for equilibrium outcomes, that is, for outcomes that are immune to individual
deviations. The contract for an active worker (that is, any worker who signs a contract)
must be acceptable for him: he should be better oﬀ under the proposed outcome than if
he did not enter the relationship. That is, the contract must be individually rational for
t h ea g e n ta tt h et i m eh es i g n si t .O n c ea na g e n th a sa c c e p t e dac o n t r a c t ,h eh a st oh o n o r
it. Also, a ﬁrm should not have incentives to deviate from the proposed outcome. A ﬁrm
can deviate by changing the contract with its assigned workers or by contracting with
other agents.10 We assume that a ﬁrm can secure the services of a worker at period  if
he did not commit to an LT contract at period  − 1 and it oﬀers him a contract under
which he obtains the same level of utility (or a slightly higher level of utility) than in his
current situation. That is, the expected level of utility of a worker who is not committed
at period  is the “price” that a ﬁrm has to pay to attract him.
Hence, an Equilibrium in the economy is an outcome where:
) all active workers obtain, at least, their outside utility (i.e., junior workers achieve an




are active in this market. We return to this issue








 expected total utility of at least  +  and senior workers obtain at least  if they
sign a contract at this age);
) no ﬁrm would obtain higher expected intertemporal proﬁts by changing the set of
proposed contracts by another set of contracts that guarantee to each worker at least the
same level of expected utility that he obtains under the current outcome.
We concentrate the analysis on stationary equilibria, that is, on equilibria where ﬁrms
follow the same strategy every period. For simplicity, we refer to stationary equilibria
simply as equilibria.
At equilibrium, a ﬁrm may
• oﬀer LT contracts to junior workers (so that it keeps them when senior whatever
their type), or
• oﬀer ST contracts to junior workers and to senior workers of high, or low, ability.




is partitioned in three subsets, some
of which may be empty: the set R of ﬁrms that oﬀer LT contracts, the set R of ﬁrms
that oﬀer ST contracts to juniors and hire high-ability seniors and the set R of ﬁrms
that oﬀer ST contracts to juniors and hire low-ability seniors. Obviously, the measures
of the sets R and R cannot be arbitrary as they must satisfy the feasibility constraint




We ﬁrst note that when one considers the analysis of one isolated ﬁrm’s optimal
contract, ST contracts are always (at least weakly) dominated by LT contracts. We
do not prove this result since it is well-established in the literature that LT contracts
typically improve the eﬃciency of the relationships by allowing both parties to commit
on the sequence of events.11 The intuition is that the ﬁrm can always replicate in the LT
contract the optimal sequence of contingent ST contracts. Moreover, LT contracts are
11On the optimality of LT contracts versus ST contracts in a single principal-agent model with repeated
moral hazard, see, for instance, Lambert (1983), Rogerson (1985), Malcomson and Spinnewyn (1988),
and Chiappori et al. (1994). This literature analyzes the role of commitment, reputation, memory and
renegotiation. In our set-up the key element is the commitment. There is no role for memory since there









 typically superior because the ﬁrm, when it signs ST contracts, cannot commit to paying
the senior worker a utility level higher than his reservation utility. Therefore, if the ﬁrm
wants to keep the senior agent independently of his type, it would obtain higher proﬁts by
signing an LT contract. In other words, we do not need to consider a fourth set of ﬁrms
-those that sign ST contracts and re-hire the same worker when senior independently of
his type- since this set is always empty at equilibrium.
Proposition 1 uses this idea to show a stronger result: in our environment, a situation
where all ﬁrms sign (optimal) LT contracts with their workers is an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There is always an equilibrium where all active ﬁrms sign LT contracts
with their workers.
If all the ﬁrms in the economy are signing LT contracts, then no single ﬁrm has
incentives to deviate and oﬀer a sequence of ST contracts. What is the advantage of
committing to an LT relationship? As discussed above, the commitment allows the ﬁrm
to relax the limited liability constraint of senior workers by delaying part of their payments
as juniors. ST contracts typically cannot replicate this strategy. Indeed, when the ﬁrm
designs the ST agreement addressed to a senior agent, the contract that governed their
relationship the previous period, while he was young, is already sunk. Therefore, the ﬁrm
will only give the agent the rents that maximize its second-period proﬁts.
The next sections explore equilibria where ST and LT contracts may coexist. We ﬁrst
discuss how to analyze equilibrium contracts by using a ﬁrm’s one-period proﬁts.
3 Equilibria and one-period proﬁts
In an equilibrium, no ﬁrm can obtain higher expected intertemporal proﬁts by changing
the set of proposed contracts. In this section, we relate this condition to the equilibrium
proﬁts that one ﬁrm obtains (or it may obtain by changing the contract) in one period.
To illustrate the discussion, we take a ﬁrm oﬀering an LT contract  =(  ∆)
with (∆)=( ∆ ∆) at each period that considers switching to a diﬀerent
sequence of LT contracts 0 =( 0
 0
∆0
).I ft h eﬁrm decides at time  to change from
 to 0,t h e ni ts t i l lh a st ok e e pi t sc o m m i t m e n tw i t ht h ec u r r e n ts e n i o rw o r k e rw h o
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Figure 1: A ﬁrm considers changing the contract
receives at time  are the same under 0 and under , because they are determined
by the realized quality of the senior agent. The only change at  concerns the payoﬀ it
oﬀers to the junior agent (0
). The new contract 0 will be fully implemented from
+1on (see Figure 1). Consequently, switching to 0 is not proﬁtable for the ﬁrm if its
proﬁts from +1on are not higher than under , also taking into account the change
in the cost of the junior worker at  (i.e., the change from  to 0
). This is equivalent
to comparing one-period proﬁts under  and under 0 from the perspective of +1
but considering the present value of the cost of the junior agent incurred at the previous
period, that is, we have to impute a cost of 1
 and 1
0
 instead of  and 0
.
The situation is similar if a ﬁrm which is currently oﬀering the contract  decides
to switch to a series of ST contracts: it ﬁr s tc h a n g e st h ec o n t r a c ti to ﬀers to the junior
agent to be able to fully implement the new strategy in the subsequent period. Also, we
face the same situation if a ﬁrm is currently oﬀering ST contracts and plans to switch
to LT contracts: it needs to change the agreement with the junior agent today but still
needs to hire a senior agent through an ST contract to be able to fully implement the
change tomorrow. Finally, when a ﬁrm switches from ST contracts to another stream of
ST contracts in a period, it can do it immediately, without waiting till the subsequent
period. Indeed, it can keep hiring junior agents under the same conditions as before (that
is, under the lowest salary that the agent is ready to accept). Whether we compute the
cost of the junior agent as 1
 or  i sn o tr e l e v a n tf o rt h ec o m p a r i s o no fp r o ﬁts in









 Therefore, we can develop the analysis of the (stationary) equilibria of our model by
focusing on the proﬁts ﬁrms make in one period, provided that we consider the cost of the
junior agent as being generated the previous period, that is, as long as we associate a cost
of 1
, instead of , to the junior agent. From now on, we will refer to this level of proﬁts
as “a ﬁrm’s one-period proﬁts” and we will denote e  = −1
+(−∆)−.Aﬁrm
h a si n c e n t i v e st os w i t c hf r o mc o n t r a c t to contract 0 if and only if e () e (0).
4 Long-term contracts in equilibrium




and that signs LT contracts with junior workers. At each period ,t h eﬁrm runs the project
w i t ht h ej u n i o ra g e n tt h a ti th i r e sa t and with the senior worker that it hired at period
 − 1. The senior agent has ability  with probability  and ability  with probability
1 − , as his ability was unknown at  − 1. As previously said, the ability of the agent
is publicly known before he starts working as a senior; hence, the LT contract signed at
 − 1 may have payments contingent on the ability of the agent when senior.12
All workers are ex-ante identical and there are more junior workers than positions
to ﬁll. Therefore, at any period there are unemployed junior agents ready to accept
any LT contract that provides them with an expected utility equal to their (two-period)
outside utility  +. Hence, the participation constraint (PC) speciﬁes that the total
expected utility the worker obtains in the relationship be at least equal to  + .
Following the discussion of the previous section, a candidate LT contract for equi-
librium ( ∆ ∆) maximizes the ﬁrm’s one-period proﬁts, also taking into






 + ( ( − ∆) − )+( 1− )(( − ∆) − )
s.t.  + 
£
(∆ +  − ()
2)+( 1− )(∆ +  − ()
2)
¤






 ≥   ≥   ≥ .
12As will be clear later, this ﬂexibility has no eﬀect on the optimal contract. Therefore, at the candidate








 If the contract does not satisfy the previous program, then the ﬁrm can deviate by oﬀering
ad i ﬀerent acceptable LT agreement to junior agents and obtain larger discounted proﬁts.























( − )+ − .
Proposition 2 If ﬁrm  is in the set R,t h e ni to ﬀers the following LT contract:
Region :I f 


















































( − )+ − 
!





















We now explain the main characteristics of the LT contract (). Despite the ab-
sence of risk aversion, the moral hazard problem of the senior agent induces an ineﬃciency
due to the presence of limited liability that restricts the capacity of the ﬁrm to induce
t h es e n i o rw o r k e rt oe x e r tah i g he ﬀort. Therefore, the ﬁrm is interested in relaxing the
senior agent’s limited liability constraint, which explains why it concentrates as much as
possible the agent’s payments in his second period of life (i.e., the ﬁr mp a y st oay o u n g
worker the minimum possible wage: 
 = .) Young agents accept contracts with a
low payoﬀ because of the credible promise to be “well” paid when they are senior. The
limited liability constraints also explain why, unless  is very low, workers are paid the
minimum salary if the outcome turns out to be a failure: 
 = 
 = .
13In this region, there are other contracts that are also candidates for equilibrium. Any combination
of ,  and  that satiﬁes  +  ( +( 1− ))+ 1
422e 2 =  +  a n ds u c ht h a te a c h
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Figure 2: Incentives in the optimal LT contracts
The impact of limited liability on bonuses and on payoﬀs obtained by agents and ﬁrms
diﬀers depending on the proﬁtability of the project  (as well as on the level of agents’
reservation utility  + ,c o s to fe ﬀort , and “average” probability of success e ).
Some characteristics are shown in Figure 2.
For high values of  (Region ) ,t h eo p t i m a lb o n u sd e p e n d so n l yo nt h ev a l u eo f
the project. The ﬁrm shares half of the value in the event of success because it maximizes
proﬁts when the senior agent supplies eﬀort 
 = 1
42 for  = . Given this bonus,
the worker ends up with a utility larger than  +  (i.e., he obtains informational
rents).
For intermediate values of  (Region ), the equilibrium payment scheme also
depends on  ,  and , as the participation constraint (together with the lim-
ited liability constraint) binds. Given that the ﬁrm needs to provide a level of utility







 ( − )+ −  for  = .
Finally, ﬁr m sw i t hl o w - v a l u e dp r o j e c t s( R e g i o n) give all the project’s returns to
the worker (they set ∆ = )i ne x c h a n g ef o raﬁxed payment (a franchise-type contract).
Therefore, agents obtain their total outside utility  +  and they provide, when
senior, the ﬁrst-best level of eﬀort 
 = 1
22 for  = .








 Corollary 1 The ﬁrm’s one-period proﬁts under () are:
Region :I f 

























( − )+ −  −
1

[2 − (1 + )] − 2









The proﬁt function e 
 () is continuously diﬀerentiable and convex in .
5 Short-term contracts in equilibrium
All ﬁrms signing ST contracts hire similar young workers, as they are indistinguishable
ex-ante. Concerning senior workers, they can decide to hire high-ability or low-ability
workers.
Consider an equilibrium where some ﬁrms sign ST contracts. A fraction of those
ﬁrms oﬀer contracts to high-ability senior agents. Denote by  the (minimum) level of
utility that this type of agent obtains at the equilibrium.14 Similarly, denote by  the
(minimum) level of utility received by low-ability senior workers. Both  and  need to
be higher than or equal to  Additionally, given the limited liability constraint and the
competition among ﬁrms,  and, possibly,  can be strictly higher than  Therefore,
a junior agent is ready to sign an ST contract that provides a utility level lower than 
as long as the reduction is not higher than the expected extra utility he will obtain when
senior. Formally, the salary  that the junior agent is ready to accept must satisfy:
 + [ +( 1− )] ≥  + ,
where we denote  and  the expected utility of a high- and a low-ability worker. For
example, if all the low-ability workers obtain the same  in all the possible jobs, then
 = .
14Given the limited liability constraint, similar senior agents might obtain diﬀerent utility levels at
equilibrium. A ﬁrm with a very high  ends up providing its senior agent a utility level higher than  as








 The candidate equilibrium contract of ﬁrm  in R (R) to a high- (low-) ability
senior agent must be the optimal one-period contract for this agent, taking into account
that it must grant him a level of utility of at least  (); that is, it solves
max
(∆)
 +  ( − ∆) − 






for  = . Next proposition provides the candidate equilibrium contract for those














Proposition 3 If ﬁrm  is in the set R with  ∈ {},t h e ni to ﬀers the following
ST contract to a senior agent:
Region 
 ():I f 

































































 −  In these two
regions, the agent’s expected utility is  Finally, in Region 
 () where the project is
very valuable, the senior agent’s eﬀort is 
 = 1
42 for  =  and he receives an
informational rent. His expected utility in this region is  + 1
1622
2  
Corollary 2 provides the expression of the ﬁrm’s one-period proﬁts under 
 (),
denoting 












 ():I f 
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422


















=  − 2 +  + 1

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 ():I f 
2 () then e 













is continuously diﬀerentiable and convex in .
6 Equilibrium matching and equilibrium contracts
The previous sections identify the equilibrium contracts once we know the type of agree-
ments ﬁrms oﬀer (that is, once the sets R, R and R are determined) and the levels
of utility  and  that they must guarantee to low- and high-ability agents. In the
present section, we characterize equilibria where at least some ﬁrms oﬀer ST contracts.
Therefore, we identify the distribution of ﬁrms in R, R and R, the levels  and
 and the minimum salary  that ﬁrms must oﬀer to juniors under ST contracts.
We look for equilibria where  = . Low-ability workers do not have special skills
and the ﬁrms will not compete for them.15 On the other hand, the level of  will be
determined by the equilibrium conditions, that is, by the (marginal) ﬁrm’s willingness
to pay to attract a high-ability worker instead of either attracting a low-ability one, or
signing an LT contract.
We develop the analysis for markets where high-ability workers are not abundant but
they make a diﬀerence for the ﬁrm they work for. That is, we consider environments with
many “normal” workers and some “stars”. Assumption 1 reﬂects this idea, together with
the reasonable hypothesis that the outside reservation utility of a senior agent is larger or
equal to that of a junior worker (part (i)). Assumption 1 (ii) states that the proportion of
high-ability agents is small enough. Finally, Assumption 1 (iii) reproduces the idea that
the diﬀerence among the two types of agent is large enough.
Assumption 1 The parameters satisfy the following conditions:
(i)  ≥ ,
15However, at equilibrium the measure of senior workers with low ability is the same as the measure of

















Why may some ﬁrms be interested in LT relationships while others prefer to secure
high-ability agents through ST contracts? Even more, why would a ﬁrm choose a strategy
that implies contracting low-ability agents through ST contracts, instead of oﬀering LT
contracts and, sometimes, beneﬁting from high-ability senior agents? The two main
equilibrium variables that make ﬁrms prefer one or another type of contract are the
salary of a young worker 
 (or rather, the comparison between 
 and )a n dt h e
diﬀerence between the cost of a high- versus a low-ability senior agent, that is,  − 
The ﬁrms that obtain large proﬁts in the event of success, that is, ﬁrms with a high ,
are ready to pay a high price to always hire a good senior agent given his added value in




must be those most interested in signing ST contracts to hire high-ability senior
agents. Similarly, ﬁrms that do not care much about agents’ eﬀort, i.e., ﬁrms with a low
, pay more attention to the potential savings they can make in a junior’s contract if
they oﬀer him an ST contract than to the gains obtained through an LT contract, or





candidates to sign ST contracts to hire low-ability senior agents.
L e m m a1p r o v i d e saﬁrst conﬁrmation of the previous intuitions. It compares the
slopes, in terms of , of the proﬁts obtained from the diﬀerent types of contract.





 ()   












 ( ),f o ra l l,a n df o ra l l ≥ .
A ﬁrm’s ST proﬁts increase with the value of success  when it hires a low-ability
worker. However, this increase is smaller than that of a ﬁrm’s proﬁts under the optimal LT
contract (part (a)). It is also smaller than the rate at which its proﬁts increase if it hires
high-ability workers through ST contracts (part (b)). A higher  implies a larger interest
16Lemma 1 (a) and 1 (b) do not depend on Assumption 1. However, if Assumption 1 does not hold,




















 in securing the services of a high-ability worker, which explains the previous relations. A
similar argument gives the intuition of part (c) in the lemma.
L e tu sd e n o t eb y the value that would “balance” the set of ﬁrms if all the ﬁrms
with   would hire low-ability workers while all the ﬁrms with  ≥  would hire







Also, we denote b  the value that makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between using LT contracts
and hiring low-ability senior workers through ST contracts, when the junior salary is






As we check in Claim 1 in the proof of Theorem 1, under Assumption 1 ﬁrm b  lies in
regions  and 






We ﬁrst consider the case where b  ∈ [ ) that is, some of the ﬁrms in the market
have a low-valued project, but there is a relatively high number of ﬁrms with valuable
projects.





(1 − )(). Then, under Assumption 1, an equilibrium exists where
(i) ﬁrms with  ≤ b  oﬀer ST contracts:  to junior workers and 
 () to low-
ability senior workers,




oﬀer the LT contracts (),
(iii) ﬁrms with  ≥  oﬀer ST contracts:  to junior workers and 
 (
 ) to
high-ability senior workers, where 





(iv) junior workers accept both LT contracts that guarantee them  +  and ST con-
tracts with 
 = ,a n d
(v) senior workers accept contracts that guarantee them .17
When  is high enough, that is, the population of ﬁrms is not concentrated on low
levels of  then, at equilibrium, ﬁrms are divided according to three hiring strategies.
17At equilibrium, high-ability workers receive a level of utility of, at least, 
  .H o w e v e r ,o u to f








 Firms with low-valued projects use ST contracts and only hire low-ability seniors; ﬁrms
with a high  also use ST contracts but they only hire high-ability seniors; and ﬁrms with
intermediary s use LT contracts.
The rationale behind Theorem 1 is the following. Firms with more proﬁtable projects
give more importance to hiring the high-ability worker, and they oﬀer more to attract
them. This increases the expected utility of a junior worker when he accepts the ST
contract: if he turns out to be of high ability he will obtain a large utility level. The
expectation of this potential reward leads workers to accept a wage  =  when junior
which is under their reservation utility  because they will be compensated in the future
(in expected terms) for this sacriﬁce. Firms with low  take advantage of this reduction
i nt h ew a g et h a tc a nb eo ﬀered to junior workers who sign ST contracts: their value of
the project is low enough so that the reduction in the wage of junior agents more than
compensates the fact that they always end up hiring low-ability senior workers.
Given the diﬀerence in equilibrium salaries between high- and low-ability senior work-
ers, ﬁrms with intermediary  do not perceive a large diﬀerence between hiring one type
or another. Therefore, it is better for them to proﬁt from the additional improvement in
eﬃciency due to the commitment they make through LT contracts.
Figure ?? draws the LT and ST proﬁts, as a function of , for the equilibrium values
for salaries and utility . As shown in Lemma 1, the slope of e 

 (
 ) is always
higher than that of e 
 () which in turn is higher than the slope of e 

 ().
At equilibrium, the market price that a ﬁrm has to pay in order to attract a high-ability
worker (
 ), is such that the three proﬁt functions cross as shown in Figure ??.
It is worth noting that even though all junior workers are indistinguishable when they
sign their equilibrium contracts and they perform identical jobs, their expected utility
is diﬀerent depending of the type of contract they are oﬀered. Under an LT contract,
a junior worker expects a total utility of  + . However, his expected utility if he
signs an ST contract with any ﬁrm is at least  + [
 +( 1− )], which is strictly
higher than  +. Therefore, workers that sign ST contracts end up receiving part of
the surplus created by the increase in eﬃciency induced by the optimal sorting of senior
agents.
Next, we consider the case where  is small (the population of ﬁrms has a big con-































Figure 3: ProﬁtF u n c t i o n sa tE q u i l i b r i u m
Theorem 2 Suppose  ≤ b . Then, under Assumption 1, an equilibrium exists where
(i) ﬁrms with   oﬀer ST contracts:  to junior workers and 
 () to low-
ability senior workers„
(ii) all ﬁrms with  ≥  oﬀer ST contracts:  to junior workers and 
 (
) to
high-ability senior workers, where 







(iii) junior workers accept ST contracts with 
 =m a x {−( +( 1− ) − )},
and
(iv) senior workers accept contracts that guarantee them .
The basic trade-oﬀs between the several contractual forms a ﬁrm can choose from do
not depend on whether  is higher or lower than b . Therefore, the intuition behind The-
orem 2 is similar to the one behind Theorem 1. However, no ﬁrm is interested in oﬀering
LT contracts when  ≤ b . ST contracts for low-ability agents provide higher proﬁts
than LT contracts for any ﬁrm with  ≤ b  while ST contracts with high-ability agents
are better than LT contracts for ﬁrms with  ≥  (given 
 and 
). Therefore,
there is no space for the intermediate region where LT contracts are the best alternative.
Theorem 2 presents a situation where, at equilibrium, the market will only be formed




















Figure 4: Types of equilibria as a function of b 
most of them are below b . Therefore, they care more about decreasing the cost of junior
agents than about the additional incentives provided by LT contracts. In fact, ﬁrms with
al o w may beneﬁtf r o mt h ee x i s t e n c eo fﬁrms with a high  in such a way that even the
marginal ﬁrm  may strictly prefer ST contracts (either with low- or with high-ability
workers) than LT contracts! This happens when   
 (and 
  ) in which case,
junior workers accept really low salaries because of the fact that they may migrate, when
senior, to a ﬁrm with a very high , which gives them high informational rents.
Finally, we consider the case where  is large (or b  is small), that is, only ﬁrms with
high-valued projects are in the market.
Theorem 3 Suppose b  . Then, under Assumption 1, no equilibrium exists where
ST contracts are adopted.
When   b ,a l lﬁrms value their projects enough so that none is ready to oﬀer ST
contracts to always keep low-ability workers. They would rather oﬀer LT agreements,
which ensures them high-ability workers with some probability.
Figure 4 represents the three types of equilibrium conﬁgurations, obtained in theorems
1, 2 and 3, as a function of b  and .
Is the market equilibrium eﬃcient? In particular, is the assignment of ﬁrms to type
of contract eﬃcient, or there would be a gain in eﬃciency by expanding, shrinking, or
changing the set of ﬁrms that oﬀer ST agreements? It is easy to check that the equilibrium
highlighted in theorems 1 and 2 is strictly more eﬃcient than that in Proposition 1. First,
ﬁrms that choose ST contracts could have chosen LT contracts, therefore their proﬁts are
higher (they are strictly higher in the interior of the regions). Second, as we discussed
after Theorem 1, workers obtain higher expected utility under ST contracts. Therefore,








 If the eﬃcient assignment of ﬁrms to type of contract involves the use of ST contracts,
the set of ﬁrms will be divided in such a way that those with the lowest  sign ST
contracts with low-ability senior agents and ﬁrms with the highest  sign ST contracts
with high-ability senior agents. By arguments similar to those before, shrinking the set
of ﬁrms and workers that sign ST contracts at equilibrium cannot be beneﬁcial: everyone
involved would lose. On the other hand, expanding the set of ﬁrms that use ST contracts at
equilibrium can improve eﬃciency. To see the reason, consider the case where b  ∈ [ ),
that is, the condition that leads to Theorem 1. If ﬁrms in the intervals
³
b  b  + 
i
and
[ − ) (where  and  are small and such that the proportion of ﬁrms in the
intervals is the same as the rate of low- versus high-ability seniors) switch to ST contracts,
then both marginally lose proﬁts. However, the workers strictly obtain higher expected
utility. Therefore, the sum of proﬁts and utility increases. This argument suggests that
ﬁrms have too much incentives, compared to the social optimum, to use LT contracts.
Assumption 1 is a suﬃcient condition that allows a precise separation of markets:
when there is a large concentration of ﬁrms with a low , then we should observe only
ST contracts while both LT and ST contracts coexist at equilibrium otherwise. However,
it is not a necessary condition.
An alternative scenario where Theorems 1 to 3 are easy to replicate is one where senior
agents are much more “important” than junior agents and, therefore, irrespective of their
ability they have more market value. In this case,  is much larger than  and/or the
discount rate  is high.18





















Theorem 4 shows that (Lemma 1 and) Theorems 1 to 3 indeed hold if we replace
Assumption 1 by Assumption 2.
18In a broad interpretation, the parameter  might also reﬂect the ratio of the length of the relationship
of a senior agent with the ﬁrm versus the length of the relationship of the junior agent. According to
this broad interpretation,  could be larger than 1. However, this would require adapting the model









 Theorem 4 Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then:
(A) if  ≤ b  , the strategies proposed in (i) to (v) from Theorem 1 constitute an
equilibrium;
(B) if  ≤ b , the strategies proposed in (i) to (iv) from Theorem 2 constitute an equi-
librium; and
(C) if b  , no equilibrium exists where ST contracts are used (as in Theorem 3).
Our analysis allows us to predict the circumstances under which ST contracts are more
likely to emerge ( ≤ b ) and those under which only ST contracts exist at equilibrium
( ≤ b ). As to the distribution of ﬁrms, that aﬀects  and  we should expect ST
contracts when there are some ﬁrms whose projects are not too proﬁtable, so that they
are ready to hire through ST agreements to save on the juniors’ wage. Moreover, only
ST contracts appear at equilibrium when the ﬁrms are mostly concentrated on low levels
of . On the other hand, we should observe the coexistence of ST and LT contracts in
markets where  is high but, simultaneously,  is low enough. In this case, there is a
relevant fraction of ﬁrms with quite proﬁtable projects (i.e., ﬁrms for which hiring a good
senior really makes a diﬀerence) and, simultaneously, there are ﬁr m st h a tg i v el i t t l ev a l u e
to the project.
For a given distribution of ﬁrms, the equilibrium includes ST contracts when b  is
high enough. Next corollary identiﬁes the characteristics of the parameters of the model
(aﬀecting b ) that make the presence of, at least, some ﬁrms with ST contracts more likely.
Corollary 3 The existence of short-term contracts at equilibrium is, ceteris paribus, more
likely,
(a) the lower is the diﬀerence between high- and low-ability seniors (2
 − 2
)
(b) the higher is the reservation utility of young workers ()a n dt h el o w e rt h em i n i m u m
wage (),
(c) the higher the discount rate (i.e., high ), and
(d) the more costly is the agents’ eﬀort (low )
Remember that b  is the value that makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between using LT
contracts and ST agreements to hire a low-ability senior, when 
 = .W h y d o e sb 
decrease when (2
 − 2
) increases? If (2
 − 2
) is larger, the optimal sorting between








 should prevail more often. However, this is not the case because the relevant question
is whether the ﬁrm (b )t h a tw a si n d i ﬀerent between LT and ST contracts with low-
ability agents, prefers LT or ST contracts once (2
 − 2
) has increased. Given that

 = ,a ni n c r e a s ei n(2
 − 2
) does not provide any additional saving in costs under
ST contracts, which is the reason for a ﬁrm to choose an ST strategy to hire low-ability
agents. However, it does increase the beneﬁts accruing to those ﬁrms if they use LT
contracts, as the diﬀerence between a high- and a low-ability agent is larger. Therefore,
increasing (2
 − 2
) provides additional incentives for a ﬁrm to prefer an LT contract to
an ST contract to hire low-ability agents and, as a consequence, LT contracts are more
likely.
A similar argument explains why ST contracts are more frequent when ( − ) is
higher: the beneﬁts from ST agreements with low-ability agents decrease. Also, a lower
 implies that ﬁrms care more about today’s cost savings (through ST contracts) than
about future gains (from LT agreements); therefore, ST contracts are more proﬁtable.
Finally, a higher  means that ﬁrms can make less proﬁt out of the same workers, which
again favors the presence of ST contracts.
Note that, in general, we can not ensure the eﬀect that an increase in the proportion of
high-ability seniors has on the emergence of ST contracting at equilibrium. The reason is
t h a t ,e v e ni fa ni n c r e a s ei n reduces the value of b  which favors the coexistence of short-
and long-term contracts, it also reduces the value of  which works in the opposite
direction. Therefore, unless we make an explicit assumption about the distribution of
ﬁrms in the  space (()), we cannot predict the exact eﬀect of  on the market
outcome.
Finally, we brieﬂy comment on the hypothesis concerning the set of active ﬁrms. We
have assumed that the set of ﬁr m sa c t i v ei nt h em a r k e ti sﬁxed and is measured by




 Therefore, we have made the implicit
assumption that, irrespective of the market outcome, all ﬁrms ﬁnd it worthwhile to stay
active in the market. This assumption can be sustained either because we consider that
the worst ﬁrm has a suﬃciently proﬁtable project (i.e.,  is high enough) or because the
ﬁxed component of the ﬁrms’ activity ()i ss u ﬃciently high. However, in general, the
set of active ﬁr m si se n d o g e n o u s ;i td e p e n d so nt h ep r o ﬁtability of the market.
















will be determined by
the condition that, at the market equilibrium, the proﬁts of the ﬁrm  are zero and the
distribution () will be derived from ().T h el e v e lo f will depend on the diﬀerent
parameters of the model. We can discuss, for example, how changes in the parameter 
aﬀect the set of active ﬁrms and the type of contracts signed in the market.
If  is very low, then the minimum  (and also ) is high. Therefore, b  (which does
not depend on the distribution of ﬁrms) is lower than  and, at equilibrium, only LT
contracts are signed. When  increases, both  and  increase until we reach the region
where ST contracts appear for low and high values of . Following the same logic as in
Figure 4 additional increases in  lead to larger regions with ST contracts, until only ST
contracts exist at equilibrium. Therefore, we should expect a prevalence of ST contracts
in those markets where the “ﬁxed” component of the revenue (that is, the component
that does not depend on incentives) is large, while we should observe LT contracts in
those markets where most of the income comes from work subject to moral hazard. This,
in fact, reﬂects the main trade-oﬀ any ﬁrm faces. Focusing solely on incentives, LT
contracts are better as they can exploit the intertemporal nature of the relationship in
order to alleviate the moral hazard problem. On the other hand, ST contracts oﬀer an
added ﬂexibility that improves the eﬃciency of the ﬁrm/worker matching. If the market
characteristics are such that incentives play an important role in all ﬁrms’ proﬁts, then
LT contracts prevail. However, if an appropriate worker selection is the key issue, then
ST contracts are used at equilibrium.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We have introduced and analyzed an equilibrium model to discuss advantages and disad-
vantages of short-term versus long-term contracts in a dynamic environment where senior
workers are subject to a moral hazard problem. On the one hand, long-term contracts
allow the better provision of incentives because ﬁrms can credibly transfer payments from
early to late periods in the life of the workers, and this transfer alleviates the incentive
compatibility constraint. On the other hand, short-term contracts allow the market to
ensure a better matching between agents’ ability and ﬁr m s ’n e e d s .T h o s ea g e n t st h a tt u r n








 We solve the model for markets where most workers have a standard ability but a
small proportion of them have high productivity; they are stars. Moreover, these stars
really make a diﬀerence in the ﬁr m st h e yw o r kf o r .
When ﬁrms operating very proﬁtable projects19 identify very talented workers, they
are ready to oﬀer very high salaries or bonuses to these stars. High-ability seniors end
up receiving high remuneration when ST contracts are in place which, in turn, allows
the reduction of the payment to juniors, who foresee the prospects of a very high wage
when seniors. Consequently, some ﬁrms having less lucrative ventures20 may not be able
to retain the high-talented workers, but they indirectly proﬁt from the existence of such
w o r k e r sa si ta l l o w st h e mt oh i r ej u n i o r sa tam u c hl o w e rc o s t .
At equilibrium, we often ﬁnd that two types of ﬁrms use short-term contracts: ﬁrms
in which the success of the project depends very much on the senior’s eﬀort, which always
end up hiring high-ability senior workers; and ﬁrms whose proﬁts do not depend too
much on the eﬀort, which hire low-ability senior workers. Intermediate ﬁrms may use
long-term or short-term contracts, depending on several market characteristics. We show
that coexistence of both types of contract is more likely when there is a relevant fraction
of ﬁrms with proﬁtable projects, when the reservation utility of young workers is low and
the minimum wage is high, when the discount rate is small, when there is a large diﬀerence
between the productivity of high- and low-ability workers, and when the agents’ eﬀort is
not too costly.
In addition to the equilibrium with short-term contracts that often exists, there always
exists an equilibrium where all ﬁrms choose a long-term contracts (see Proposition 1).
However, we argue that, in our environment, whenever the equilibrium with short-term
contracts and the one with only LT contracts coexist, the former is more “robust” or
“sensible” as the latter is a “knife-edge” result. The full long-term outcome is sustained
by the fact that, since no other ﬁrm is choosing a short-term contract, no ﬁrm can proﬁt
from the enhanced ﬂexibility that short-term contracts oﬀer. A small amount of ﬁrms
with low-valued projects and another with high-valued projects have incentives to switch
from LT to ST agreements to obtain higher proﬁts.
Appendix
19Projects where the incentives of the senior play an important role in ﬁrms’ proﬁts.








 A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We ﬁr s tn o t et h a t ,i nas i t u a t i o nw h e r ea l lﬁrms sign LT contracts, if a ﬁrm
follows the strategy of oﬀering ST contracts to its workers, it necessarily hires as senior
a g e n ta tp e r i o d the same agent that it hired as a junior at period  − 1.A l s o ,t h eo n l y
alternative occupation for the senior agent is to get out of the market, since no other
ﬁrm is interested in hiring him, independent on his ability. Then, any sequence of ST
contracts can be replicated as an LT contract. Therefore, the optimal ST contracts cannot
give higher proﬁts than the optimal LT contracts.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Substituting  and  by their value and multiplying the objective function by








∆ ( − ∆) − 
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∆( − ∆) − 
¶
− 


















≥  +  (1)
 ≥   ≥   ≥ .
Let  ,  and  be the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraints. The
Kuhn-Tucker (ﬁrst-order) conditions of the above maximization problem include the con-
straints, and the non-negativity of the multipliers:  ≥ 0,  ≥ 0,  ≥ 0,  ≥ 0 The


















∆ =0  (3)
which imply that ∆ = ∆, which we denote ∆ in the rest of the proof.
The derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to ,  and  are:
−1+ +  =0 
− +  +  =0  (4)








 which imply  =1− ,  = (1 − ) and  = (1 − )(1− );therefore, either the





























 ( − )=0
 ( − )=0 











We study the diﬀerent regions where the Kuhn-Tucker conditions may be satisﬁed:
Case / 1: 0, 0,   0,   0 Payments when young and in case of failure are




 [( + ) − (1 + )].














[( + ) − (1 + )]
#

Case 2:  =0 0   0,   0.T h e n  =  =  = ,a n d∆ = 
2.I n




 [( + ) − (1 + )]
(The candidate at the lower bound of this case coincides with the candidate at the higher
bound of Case 1.)
Case 3:  =  =  =0 .T h e n =1and ∆ = . We write the participation constraint
as




2 =  + 
Any combination of ,  and  that satisﬁes the previous constraint and such that the
three values are larger or equal to  constitutes an optimal solution (in particular, the val-
ues proposed in the proposition). This can be the case only if +( +( 1− )) ≥




 [( + ) − (1 + )].
T h eu n i q u ec a n d i d a t ef o re a c hv a l u eo f is the optimal solution of the ﬁrm’s maxi-
mization program. From the optimal contract in each case, it is immediate to compute
agent’s eﬀort(s) and utility, and ﬁrm’s proﬁts. Additionally, easy calculations show that








 C Proof of Proposition 3














 +  ≥ 
 ≥ .
Let   be the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraints. The Kuhn-Tucker
(ﬁrst-order) conditions of the above maximization problem include the constraints, and
the non-negativity of the multipliers:  ≥ 0,  ≥ 0 The derivatives of the Lagrangian
with respect to  and ∆ are








∆ =0  (6)








We study the diﬀerent regions.
Case / 1: 0, 0 Payment are  =  and ∆ = 2

√
 − . This is a candidate











Case 2:  =0 0.T h e n = ,a n d∆ = 
2. In this case the participation constraint




Case 3:  =0 .T h e n∆ = , which implies  =1 0. The participation constraint is
1
422
2 +  =  Therefore,  =  − 1
422




T h eu n i q u ec a n d i d a t ef o re a c hv a l u eo f is the optimal solution of the ﬁrm’s maximization
program. From the optimal contract in each case, it is immediate to compute agent’s
eﬀort(s) and utility.
D Proof of Lemma 1





 (),a n d
 









 reach some 1 (either 
1 (),o r
1 ,o r
1 ()), then they are constant until they
reach a second threshold 2 and, from 2 on, they are linear in  again. The proof of
the three parts in the lemma is similar. We write a complete proof of part (a) and we
point out the main elements of parts (b) and (c).
(a) First, notice that if  lies in both regions 







22e 2 =  
  The same comparison holds if  lies in both regions 
 () and
. Additionally, if  lies in both regions 















1 () (and 
2 ≥ 
2 ()), then  
 is increasing in a
larger region of parameters than
 

 before becoming constant (at a higher level than
 

 in region 
 ()). Finally, even if
 

 starts increasing again (i.e., it reaches
region 
 ())b e f o r e 
 (because 
2 () ≤ 
2 ), it is always lower than the
latter, since it is lower even when  = 
2 , given that we have seen that
 

   

for any  which lies in both regions 
 () and .
Third, suppose 
1  
1 () (and 
2  








 reaches the region where it becomes constant, and that it is
certainly also smaller when it starts increasing again (because  
 has reached this
region before), it is not possible that the two derivatives cross. Therefore,
 

   

for any 0.
(b) If  lies in both regions 











  The same comparison holds in regions 
 () and 
 (). Also, if  lies in
both regions 







 −   1

√




T h er e s to ft h ep r o o fi si d e n t i c a lt ot h eo n ei np a r t( a ) .
(c) For  in both regions  and 
















 ( − )+ −   1

√
 −  =
 







 ( − )+ − 
¤
+ . If this inequality holds, the rest of the proof of Lemma








( − )+ − 
¸
+  (7)
which, given Assumption 1 (i), is implied by (2























(1 + )(1 − ),i . e . ,(1 − ) −  ≥ 0 which closes the proofs.
E Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We do the proof through a series of claims.
Claim 1:I f
 = ,t h e nb  
1 () and b  
1 .
P r o o fo fC l a i m1:I ft h ev a l u eb  that satisﬁes e 
(b )=e 

 (b ) lies in both re-
gions  and 
 () (i.e., b  
1 () and b  






Moreover, it is easy to check that each of the inequalities b  
1 () and b  
1 is
equivalent to the following:

2








( − ) (8)
Given Assumption 1 (i), (8) is implied by Assumption 1 (ii).












   = b 
´
.
If junior workers anticipate that they will obtain at least b  when senior if they turn out
to be high-ability, then they are ready to accept 
 = .









b  −  we will compute the corresponding b  in this region, and


































) b 2 or b  = + 1































) b 2 − 
i
, i.e., 2
 b 2  (2)
2 ( − ), which is equivalent
to (8). Finally, given b , and taking into account that  ≥ b  and  ≥ ,
a junior worker is ready to accept an ST contract with 
 whenever 







) b 2 ≥  + , that is, when 
 ≥ .












 =  
¢
for any  ≥ b  and





















 =  
´
for any  ≥ b . Then, the claim follows after Lemma 1 (b).






















P r o o fo fC l a i m4:T h eﬁrst inequality follows after Claim 3,a l s ot a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h a t
  b  implies 
  b . The second inequality follows the deﬁnition of b  and Lemma
1( a ) .
Claim 5: e 























P r o o fo fC l a i m5:T h eﬁrst part of the inequality follows after the characterization of 

in part (vi) of the theorem, by the property that 
  b  and Lemma 1 (c). The second
part follows the deﬁnition of b  and Lemma 1 (a).




















P r o o fo fC l a i m6: By the same argument as in Claim 5, the maximum of the two terms
inside the maximization is e 
 (). Then, the inequality is implied by the characteri-
zation of 
 in part (vi) of the theorem, by the property that 
  b  and Lemma 1
(c).
FP r o o f o f T h e o r e m 2
Proof. Given that the behavior of the workers is optimal by construction, we prove the
theorem if we show that ﬁrms’ strategies are optimal. We do it through a series of claims.
Claim 1: 







P r o o fo fC l a i m1.G i v e nt h a t ≥ 













) because this inequality
is equivalent to  ≤ b .
Claim 2:  ≤ 
1 (
)









) −  if and only if  ≤ 2

p
 −  =

1 () which is implied by the fact that  ≤ b  and b  ≤ 
1 () (by Claim 1 in






















 P r o o fo fC l a i m3.G i v e nt h a t ≤ 
1 () and  ≤ 
1 (
) the ﬁrst equality comes
directly from the deﬁnition of 
 To prove the inequality, we notice that  ≤ 
1 
because  ≤ b  and b  ≤ 
1 (by Claim 1 in the proof of Theorem 1). Given that
 ≤ 
1 and  ≤ 


























≥−  − 1





 This inequality holds because it is equivalent to
 ≤ b 
















 for any  
P r o o fo fC l a i m4: It follows from Claim 3 and Lemma 1 (a) and (b).
















 for any  ≥ 
P r o o fo fC l a i m5: It follows from Claim 3 and Lemma 1 (b) and (c).
G Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We recall that b  is characterized by e 
(b )=e 

 (b ).I fb  ,t h e n




. Therefore, Lemma 1 (b) implies e 
()  e 

 ()




. It easily follows that e 
() e 






 ≥  and  ≥ . Therefore, at equilibrium, no ST contract can be signed, since
it would imply that some ﬁrms choose the strategy of keeping low-ability senior workers,
which is dominated by the strategy of always oﬀering LT contracts.
H Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. The proofs of theorems 1 and 2 and that of Lemma 1 only use Assumption 1 to
show that the inequalities (7) and (8) hold. Therefore, we prove theorem 4 if we show









( − ) 
2










( − )  e 
2 ( − ).
The ﬁrst inequality corresponds to (8). Moreover, it is easy to check that the second
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